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Among  African  health  programs,  this  program  to  control
"riverblindness" is an exceptional recent success story. Here are
some lessons from it.
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Onchocerciasis is a devastating African  The main challenges of the program have
parasitical disease that causes sevcre debilitation  been to combat the reinvasion of controlled areas
and intense itching.  By the time its victims are  by blackflies, to manage multiple resistance to
in their late twenties, they experienec impaired  the larvicides that were used, avoiding any
vision, often blindness.  River villages are  negative impact on the environment, to develop a
particularly afflicted because the blackflies  drug that would kill the parasites, and to hand
which transriit  the worm parasite that causes the  control of residual responsibilities over to the
disease breed in rivers - hence the colloquial  beneficiary countries once the program ends.
"riverblindness."
Liese and his collcagues identify the main
The connection between life by the river and  reasons for the program's  success as:
blinding onchocerciasis lcd to the virtual aban-
donment of many fertilc river valleys, so poten-  Limited, achievable, clearly defined objec-
tially productive lands lay idle for many years.  tives and a realistic 20-year timeframe.  The
Yet millions continued to succumb to the disease  request for a 20-year commitment did not meet
until the onchocerciasis control program, a large  with potential donors' immediate approval, but
multidonor-supported effort initiated in 1973 ar  the proponents of the program remained firm in
the instigation of Robeit McNamara, then head  their assessment that this much time was neces-
of the World Bank.  sary to eliminate the parasite reservoir in the
human population.
Today, 95 percent of the original seven-  e  Use of the best technology available for any
country area is virtually free of the disease, and  task.
previously deserted lands are being resettled and  e  Contracting out highly specialized tasks
cultivated, increasing agricultural production.  such as aerial spraying.
* Operationai r> .:arch (considered an equal
From the beginning, the program maintained  partner in progratn implementation).
a limited, specific objective: to control  *  Program autonomy, which allowed flexibil-
onchocerciasis in a clearly delineated area in the  ity in responding to strategic and technological
savannah zones of West Africa. The operational  issues.
focus was to interrupt transmission of the disease  - Delegation of authority to those most
and eventually eliminate the parasitc in all the  closely involved in the program, thus assuring a
human population.  The only acceptable ap-  clear focus and flexibility.
proach was effcctive control of the disease-  e  Long-range planning to sustain donor
transmitting blackfly. The strategy was to focus  commitment.
on destroying blackily larvae located in fast-  e  Transparency, made possible by a compre-
flowing rivers, which could easily be targeted  hensive flow of information and the program's
with aerial spraying.  openness to evaluation and review.
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1.  Development  of health  systems  in  West  Africa  has  been fraught  with
difficulties  for  many  years  and  most  health  services  still  fall  far short  of
meeting  basic  needs. In  most  West  African  nations  the  paucity  of human  and
financial  resources,  management  capability,  and  political  will  has made
lasting  improvements  difficult  to achieve  even  when  financlal  support  from  aid
agencies  such  as the  World  Bank  has  been  readily  available. Some  programs,
however,  have met  with sttccess  despite  these  constraints. These  are, in
particular,  programs  which  have  been focused  on one  disease  or a group  of
diseases. The  Smallpox  Eradication  Program  has  been the  classic  example  and
the  Expanded  Program  of Immunization  has  had a  significant  impact  on five
major  diseases  affecting  children.  The  most  notable  recent  example,  however,
is the  Onchocerciasis  Control  Program  (OCP)  in  West  Africa. The  OCP  is
recognized  as a solid  pillar  of achievement  among  health  development  efforts
and is considered  by the  donor  community  the  most successful  health  program  in
West Africa. This  paper  reviews  the  OCP's  experience  with the  objective  of
drawing  more general  lessons  for  the  Bank's  health  and  development  work.
2.  Onchocerciasis  has long  been the  cau  e of great  human  suffering  across  a
wide part  of Africa  stretching  westward  from  the  Sudan  to  Senegal  and
southward  to  Malawi. Although  not confined  to it,  the  disease  is most
devastating  in the  drier  sudan  and  guinea-savannah  areas  and  is caused  by a
thread-like  worm,  gngh2ceygA  ygbMIj,  which  is spread  by the  bite  of female
blackflies  (Sitiultua  daMo  s.l.).1  Victims  of  onchocerciasis  experience
severe  debilitation  and  itching  due  to the  proliferation  of millions  of infant
worms  produced  by adult  worms  located  in  unsightly  nodules  under  the  skin.  By
the  time  victims  are in their  late  twenties  and  have  been repeatedly  infected
by the  parasite,  the  result  is impaired  vision  and  often  blindness. Although
it  is  not a killer  disease,  onclhocerciasis  appears  to  reduce  life  expeftancy
and  threatens  the  viability  and  very existence  of entire  communities. Since
the  blackflies  which  spread  onchocerciasis  breed  in rivers,  those  villages
located  close  to them  are  the  most severely  afflicted;  hence  the  colloquial
term  nriverblindnessv.
1Some  of  the  several  varieties  of SimulLu dMo  s.l.  are  more  effective
vectors than others.  The species  complex  is divided  into forest  forms (f.
soubreng  , E..  mncetigauli  and  E. Y1bQnsu),  savannah  forms  (a.  sirbansa  and  S.
gE2JUX  s.s.)  and an intermediate  variety E. msuamosum.  Control efforts
concentrate  on  the  savannah  forms  and  E. louaRwsum  since  the  forest  forms  do  not
appear  to  be responsible  for  blinding  onchocerciasis.2
conomic  Impact
3.  The connection  becween  life  by the  river  and  blinding  onchocerciasis  led
to the  virtual  abandonment  of  many fertile  river  valleys. People  crowded  on
to  marginally  productive  lands  plagued  by over-farming,  desertification  and
drought,  while  potentially  productive  lands  have lain idle  for  many years. As
transmission  of the  disease  is  possible  anywhere  within  the  very extensive
flight  range  of the  blackfly  vector,  moving  out  of these  river  valleys  has  not
guaranteed  protection  from  onchocerciasis;  millions  were still  infected  by the
parasite. Many  who  would  otherwise  be at the  peak of their  productive  lives
found  themselves  unable  to contribute  adequately  to the  support  of their
families. Extended  famalies  or other  villagers  were forced  to provide  for
those  disabled  by the  disease. In the  never-changing  situation,  new  victims
succumb  to  blindness  and  take  the  place  of those  who  died,  so  maintaining  the
burden  of this  disease  on the  commun  4y.
History  of the  Progrm
4.  In the  1960s,  the  French  scientific  research  organization,  ORSTOM,
operating  in  conjunction  with the  Organization  de Cooperation  et Coordination
des  Grandes  Endemies  (OCCGE),  collected  a large  amount  of data  on
onchocerciasis  and the  blackfly  vector  in  western  Burkina  Faso,  northern  C6te
d'Ivoire,  and  Mali.  The  World  Health  Organization  (WHO),  in an inter-country
project  supported  by the  United  Nations  Development  Program  (UNDP),  gathered
similar  data from  northern  Ghana,  eastern  Burkina  Faso  and  northern  Togo.
These  studies  confirmed  that  the  Volta  River  Basin  in  West  Africa  was the
largest  contiguous  focus  of onchocerciasis  in  Africa  and  documented  the
devastating  effect  of onchocerciasis  on the  region's  population  and  economy.
5.  Following  the  positive  outcome  of a  conference  in 1968  deeming  the
control  of onchocerciasis  feasible,  seven  West  African  Governments--Benin,
Burkina  Faso,  COte  d'Ivoire,  Ghana,  Mali,  Niger,  and  Togo--requested,  in 1969,
WHO  assistance  in  formulating  the  terms  and  conditions  of an onchocerciasis
control  program. They  clearly  recognized  that  onchocerciasis  was  a  major
health  problem  in  their  savannah  areas  and  that  the  disease  was  wreaking  havoc
among  their  rural  populations  who  were debilitated,  blinded  and  forced  to
abandon  fertile  river  valleys. The governments  of these  countries  were  keenly
aware  that the  blackfly  vector  did  not respect  political  boundaries,  and that
independent  national  effort  could  not control  onchocerciasis  effectively. The
costs  and implications  would  exceed  the  capabilities  of any  one  government  and
intercountry  collaboration  and  donor  assistance  would  be necessary.
6.  In 1970,  UNDP  provided  funding  for  a Pre-Asslstance  to  Governments  (PAG)
Miusion  to the  above  seven  countries,  the  report  of which  was  presented  to  a
meeting  of potential  donors  in  Paris  in  December  1973.  The report  concluded
that  effective  onchocerciasis  control  could  be achieve  in savannah  zones  only
if its  endemic  area  were  clearly  delineated  and if such  control  were intensive
and sustained  cnerein  long  enough  to  kill  off the  indigenous  parasite. The
PAG  Mission  report  thus identified  an area  of 640,000  km2 incorporating  18,000
km of rivers,  to  be kept  under  control  for  20 years  at an  estimated  cost  of
US$120  million  (at  1973  dollar  value). Nine  donors  and  agencies--Canada,
France,  the  Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Netherlands,  the  United  Kingdom,  the3
United  States  of  America,  UNDP, the  World  Bank,  and  WHO then  pledged  their
commitment  to the  Onchocerciasis  Control  Program  which  was launched  in  January
1974.
7.  The  Bank  has  played  a  vital  role in the  Implementation  of the  OCP  from
the  outset. Its  participation  began in  1972  when Robert  McNamara,  then
President  of the  World  Bank,  visited  West  Africa  and  was so concerned  about
the  dreadful  impact  of onchocerciasis  on entire  communities  that  he promptly
convened  a  meeting  in  London  with the  heads  of  UNDP,  the  Food  and  Agricultural
Organization  (FAO),  and  WHO to consider  what  might  be done  wlth regard  to the
control  of the  disease  and the  subsequent  development  of the  river  valleys.
A Steering  Committee  was  consequently  established  in 1973,  composed  of
representatives  from  each  of the  above  agencies,  whose  mandate  was to guide
the  development  of a program. The Steering  Committee  gave  support  to the  PAG
Mission  and  helped  to  establish  the  structure  of the  program. The  Bank  also
made an important  contribution  to strengthening  the  management  of the  program,
in its  early  years,  by seconding  one  of its  senicr  staff  to  assume  the
position  of Director  of OCP  for  a  period  of three  years.
8.  Since  then,  the  OCP  has doubled  its  'perational  area  to cover  1.3
million  km2 and  50,000  km of rivers. It has incorporated  four  more countries:
Guinea,  Guinea  Bissau,  Senegal  and  Sierra  Leone;  and  it  has attracted  a
further  15 donors:  the  African  Development  Bank,  Belgium,  the  European
Economic  Community,  Finland,  the  Gulbenkian  Foundation,  Italy,  Japan,  the
Republic  of Korea,  Kuwait,  Luxembourg,  Norway,  the  OPEC Fund  for  International
Development,  Portugal,  Saudi  Arabia,  and  Switzerland,  to support  an annual
budget  of approximately  US$30  million. Complete  operational  coverage  of this
enlarged  program  area  was  achieved  in 1990.
9.  Today  the  program  is  an acknowledged  success. Ninety  percent  of the
original  area Is  virtually  free  of onchocerciasis.  The  population  is  no
longer  debilitated  from the  disease. To date  blindness  has been  prevented  in
over  100,000  people,  and  9  million  children  born in the  area  since  1974  are  no
longer  at zisk  of  contracting  the  disease. Vector  control  activities
throughout  90%  of the  original  area  have  been  halted  since  the  risk  of
recrudescence  of onchocerciasis  is now  negligible. Moreover,  fertile  river
valleys  have  been opened  up for  socioeconomic  development  and  new communities
are  being  established  along  rivers  where  previously  people  would  have  been
exposed  to the  worst  ravages  of the  disease. National  governments  can  now
confidently  promote  farming  and  agroindustry  in these  areas,  supplanting
dependency  with  surplus  production.  Already,  previously  deserted  lands  are
the  site  of thriving  plantations  producing  sugar,  tea,  cotton,  rice  and other
food  and  export  crops.
The  OnchocSerLcas  COntrol  StrEAteg
10.  From the  beginning,  the  program  has  maLntained  a  limited  and  specific
objective:  to control  onchocerciasis  in a  clearly  delineated  area  in the
savannah  zones  of West  Africa.  This  objective  was initially  linked  to the
socioeconomic  development  of the  area  and,  later,  to the  development  of the
capability  in the  health  sector  in  each  of the  Participating  Countries  to
maintain  onchocerciasis  control. However,  these  considerations  have  not  been4
allowed  to  detract  from  the  principal  goal  of  the  program  to  achieve
onchocerciasis  control.
11.  In  the  absence  of  a suitable  drug  or  vaccine,  the  operational  focus  of
the  OCP  has  been  to  interrupt  onchocerciasis  transmission  leading  to  the
eventual  elimination  of the  parasite. The PAG  mission  report  confirmed  that
the  only  acceptable  approach  was the  effective  control  of the  blackflies  that
transmit  the  disease.  With  a flight  range  that  exceeds  300  km,  the  adult
blackflies  disperse  too  widely  and  are  ntot  targetable.  As  a  result,  the
strategy  has of necessity  focused  on blackfly  larvae  whose  locations  are
identifiable.  The  blackfly  breeding  sltes  are  not  hard  to  find  since  the
females  deposit  eggs  only  in  fast-flowing  parts  of  rivers  and  streams.  For
the  8-to-10-day  period  when  the  larvae  are  developing  in  the  water,  they  can
be  killed  by  larvicide.  The  weekly  application  of  larvicide  upstream  of
breeding  sites 2 has  been  the  basic  control  strategy  of  the  OCP  and  it  has
remained  unchanged  since  the  program  began.
12.  Because  of  the  length  of  river  (between  5,000-30,000  miles)  which  has  to
be  covered  on  a  weekly  basis  and  the  inabilit'  to  reach  all  the  breeding  sites
during  all seasons  by road,  grcund  treatment  has  proven  inadequate  and
ineffective  against  1.  4&=sum.  The  program  has,  therefore,  had  t^-  employ
aircraft  to  obtain  the  necessary  coverage.  This  is  often  dangerous,  since
many  of  the  targets  are  along  winding  and  narrow  watercourses,  and  both
helicopters  and  fixed  wing  aircraft  with  highly  skilled  p'lIots  must  be  used.
The  aerial  spraying  has  therefore  been  contracted  out  to  private,  specialized
firms.  This  singular  method  of  vector  control  is  the  most  cost-effective
technology  for  OCP. One  helicopter  can  do  in  one  hour  what  a  highly  trained
ground  application  team  could  not  achieve  in  a  week. The  operations  are
sophisticated,  currently  engaging  up  to  11  helicopters  and  two  fixed  wing
aircraft,  and  require  a  high  degree  of  coordination  between  the  aerial
spraying  team  and  the  program  staff  who  determine  when,  where  and  how  much  the
pilots  are  to  spray.  This  coordination  of  larviciding  activities  is  the
responsibility  of  OCP. Deployment  of  the  aircraft  depends  on  the  weekly
collection  and  anvlysis  of  data  on  the  quantity  and  location  of  breeding
sites,  on  water  levels  and  water  discharge  (which  affect  the  quantities  of
larvicide  to  be  applied),  and  on  the  effectiveness  of  the  previous  week's
application  of  larvicide.  The  program  must  ensure  that  the  fuel  and  pesticide
depots  are  regularly  replenished  throughout  the  program  area. It  must  also
monitor  the  size  of  the  biting  blackfly  population,  and  periodically  measure
the  level  of  infection  in  the  human  population.
13.  The  lifeline  of the  system  is  a radio  network. This  network  links  the
information-gathering  field  offices  throughout  the  program  area  to  the  two
operations  centers--in  Bamako,  Mali  in  the  west  and  in  Kara,  Togo in the  east
2 The  blackfly  eggs  are  deposited  on  to  stems  and  rocks  just  below  the  water
surface;  within  two  days  they  hatch  and  the  larvae  again  attach  to  substrates
in  the  water.  The  larvae  filter  small  particles  from  the  water  that  pass  through
their  digestive  system.  At  this  stage,  any  larvicide  particles  introduced  into
the  stream  are  trapped  in  the  filter  fans  and  pass  into  the  gut  killing  the
larvae.5
-- which  deploy  the  aerial  spraying  fleet. The radio  network  also  enables  the
Program  Headquarters  in  Ouagadougou,  Burkina  Faso, to  maintain  contact  with
all  aspects  of operations. The location  of targets  for  spraying  is  determined
by mobile  toams  supervised  by entomologists  which  capture  t'  e  blackflies  for
analysis  of their  numbers  and their  potential  to transmit  onchocerciasis.
This  information,  together  with  water  levels  taken  in river  gorges,  is  relayed
by radio  from  subsector  to  sector  offices  and  from there  to the  operations
centers  where  the  maps to  guide  the  pilots  in  their  weekly  circuit  of spraying
are  prepared.
14.  Measurement  of the  impact  of blackfly  control  on onchocerciasis  in the
village  populations  is  carried  out  by three  medical  and  ophthalmological  teams
which  monitor  the  level  of infection  in  a large  sample  of communities
throughout  the  program  area.  A sample  of  villages  is visited  on rotation
every  three  years  to plot  the  change  in  disease  patterns  over time. This
indicates  when  populations  are  or will  be free  of the  disease  or if there  are
some impediments  to progress.
The  Program  Structure
15.  Becaase  of  their  inability  to  undertake  effective  control  of
onchocerciasis  on a national  level,  the  Participating  Governments,  through
signed  Memoranda  of Agreement,  gave  OCP the  mandate  to  carry  out  the  control
operations  throughout  the  delineated  area  on their  behalf.
16.  The OCP  was formally  set  up with its  own independent  structure  with  WHO
as executing  agency,  and  the  Bank  as fiscal  agency  responsible  for  all  fund-
raising. However,  the  governing  body of the  OCP  is the  Joint  Program
Committee  (JPC)  comprised  of representatives  from  the  Participating  Countries,
the  Sponsoring  Agencies,  and  the  donors. The  JPC,  which  has its  own terms  of
reference  approved  by all  members  including  the  Bank and  WHO, ensures  the
implementation  of OCP  policy  and  approves  budgets. A critical  feature  of tne
JPC is its  functional  independence  from  WHO and  WHO's  governing  bodies,  i.e.
the  World  Health  Assembly  and  the  WHO Executive  Board;  it is thus  not
distracted  or influenced  by the  political  priorities  of WHO.  This  was
particularly  important  in the  early  years  of the  program  when  OCP's  vertical
approach  towards  combatting  a single  disease  was at divergence  with  WHO's
multivalent  primary  health  care  policy.
17.  The day-to-day  steering  and  coordination  of the  OCP is  delegated  by the
JPC to the  Committee  of Sponsoring  Agencies  (CSA)  (the  successor  to the
Steering  Committee)  which  meets  several  times  during  the  year.  Within  the
CSA,  the  principal  actors  are  the  World  Bank and  WHO  because  of the  critical
roles  they  play in the  program's  implementation  as fiscal  and  executing
agencies,  respectively. It is the  CSA  which  actually  follows  the  program  most
closely,  guiding  policy  development,  reviewing  plans  and  programs,  maintaining
short-term  financial  control,  and  monitoring  overall  implementation  of the
program  between  annual  sessions  of the  JPC.  The  OCP  Director,  therefore,  has
several  opportunities  during  the  year  to report  on the  program  and  to seek
guidance  in resolving  operational  or financial  problems. Also,  problem
solving  and  preparation  for  CSt.  meetings  has  been facilitated  by regular
contact  and flow  of information  between  the  Program  Director's  liaison  officer6
in Geneva,  who is also  the  Secretary  of the  CSA,  and  the  Bank's  representative
In  Washington,  D.C.
18.  As Executing  Ageney  for  the  Program,  WHO  carries  out  the  action  plans
and  strategiea  approved  by the  JPC.  WHU, in  consultation  with the  CSA,
appoints  the  OCP Program  Director  who reports  dlrectly  to the  JPC.  Having
been delegated  full  responslbility  for  OCP  by the  Director  General  of  WHO, he
has relative  freedom  and  independence  of action  within  WHO on  matters
pertainLng  to the  program. WHO itself  provides  technical,  administrative  and
legal  assistance  ln such  areas  as larvLcide  development  and  selection,  drug
screening,  hiring  and  procurement. As the  Flscal  Agent  for  the  program,  the
World  Bank  manages  the  Onchocerciasis  Trust  Fund,  which  constitutes  all  donor
contributions,  and  disburses  OCP funds  on a quarterly  basis  through  WHO.  In
addition  to contributing  from  its  own  account,  the  World  Bank is responsible
for  mobilizing  financial  resources  from  the  donor  community. The separation
of executing  and fiscal  responsibilities  is  a feature  of the  program  that
deserves  special  notice. It  opened  up sources  of financing  not  normally
available  to  WHO, and  most importantly,  it  avoided  conflict  between  WHO's
regional  or global  priorities  and  the  needs  of the  program.  In addition,  the
fLscal  arrangements  permitted  an ongoing  external  control  on expenditures  by
the  World  Bank  as  a  representative  of the  donors  and  as a  member  of the  CSA.
19.  The program  structure  also includes  two  very lmportant  independent
statutory  review  bodies  which  report  directly  to the  JPC.  First,  a twelve-
member  Expert  Advlsory  CommLttee  (EAC)  audits  the  scientlfic  and technical
aspects  of the  program. Second,  a five-member  Ecological  Group  (EG)  monitors
the  impact  of larvicide  used in  vector  control  on the  riverine  ecology  and
advises  on the  selection  of new insecticide  products. The  members  of these
two  bodies,  whlch  meet formally  once  a  year in the  program  area,  are
indlviduals  of international  repute. They are  selected  by the  CSA  and
appointed  by WHO for  a two-year  period  without  prejudice  to re-selection.
Both  groups  have  played  a critical  role  in  OCP, since  its  inception,  by
recommending  or endorsing  important  modlfications  in  program  operations.
Their  views  are  highly  respected  by the  JPC in  helping  that  governing  body
reach  important  decisions.
20.  Finally,  in  each  of the  Participating  Countries,  a  National
Onchocerciasis  Committee  (NOC)  coordinates  local  OCP  activities  and  provides
practical  assistance  to field  operations. The  Participating  Countries  have
committed  to pay  up to 1.4%  of program  expenditures  in  cash  contributions  or
to  provide  the  required  national  staff  for  the  operations  in their  country.
In the  latter  case  the  Participating  Governments  are forced  to  be more closely
involved  in OCP  but full  management  responsibility  is  retained  by OCP  which
provides  a salary  supplement  and  per  diem  to the  staff  concerned. In
addition,  the  NOCs  have  held joint  annual  meetings  that  have proven  to  be an
important  and  productive  forum  for  discussion  of shared  problems  resulting
from the  program's  activities  and  success. Likewise  the  donors  meet
periodically  in seminars  hosted  by the  Bank  to review  matters  of common
interest  related  to the  ongoing  financlal  support  to the  OCP.
21.  The  program  has  been implemented  in six-year  financial  phases,  each  with
separate  projected  costs  formally  approved  by the  JPC and  supported  by Fund7
Agreements  signed  by  the  donors.  The  Memorandum  of  Agreement  incorporated
within  the  Fund  Agreements 5 is  also  signed  by  the  Participating  Governments.
In  addition,  the  program  prepares  annual  budgets  that  must  be  presented  for
approval  at  the  annual  meetings  of  the  JPC. By  the  end  of  1989,  program
expenditures  amounted  to  US$282  million  to  which  the  Bank  had  contributed
US$28  million  through  the  Special  Grant  Program.
Major  Challentes
22.  The  successes  of  OCP  have  not  been  achieved  without  several  challenges
having  to  be  met  and  addressed  at  different  period  of  its  Lmplementation.  The
major  challenges  have  been  Oreinvasion",  resistance  to  larvicide,  monitoring
OCP's  environmental  impact,  the  development  of  a  curative  drug  and  the  handing
over  of  maintenarce  activities  to  the  Participating  Governments
(Odevolutionn).
23.  Blackfly  Reimgion and-Extension  of  the  Program.  From  the  start,
reinvasion  of  blackflies  emanating  from  source  rivers  outsLde  the  orlginal
program  area  has  presented  a  problem  ln  controlled  areas.  About  10%  of  the
original  program  area,  primarily  along  its  periphery,  was  affected  in  this
way. A significant  percentage  of  these  incoming  flies  carried  D.  vlvulus
worms  and  thus  reintroduced  new  infection  to  the  reinvaded  area. As the
overall  attainment  of  program  objectives  was  clearly  threatened,  the  only
effective  solution  was  to  extend  the  spraying  operations  to  incorporate  the
river  sources  of  these  blackflies.  In  1978,  a  minor  extension  of  spraying
into  southern  COte d'Ivoire  had  some  impact  in  this  regard  but  a  major
extension  of  spraying  was  recognized  as  being  necessary  and  was recommended in
1981 by  an  Independent  Commission that  was established  to  review  the  program.
Based  on  OCP studies  in  southern  Ghana,  Togo,  and  Benin  and  by  similar  WHO
(and  later  OCP)  studies  in  Guinea,  Guinea  Bissau,  western  Mali,  Senegal  and
Sierra  Leone,  the program  prepared  a  Long  Term  Strategy  Paper  that
established  the  cost-effectiveness  of  extending  the  program  in  order  to
preserve  its  achievements.  Although  approved  by  the  JPC  for  the  third
financial  phase  beginning  in  1986,  implementation  of  spraying  operations  in
the  Western  and  Southern  Extensions  was  considerably  delayed  because  of  a
flare-up  of  resistance  to  the  key  larvicide.  The  EG,  supported  by  the  EAC,
placed  an  Immediate  embargo  on  any  extension  to  the  operational  area  until  the
OCP  had  at  least  three  back-up  larvicides  to  temephos  (the  product  presently
used),  esch  of  which  was  operationally  viable  and  environmentally  acceptable.
When  this  condition  was  met  and  approval  given  by  the  JPC,  spraying  eventually
started  in  the  Extension  areas  and  full  coverage  of  the  total  Extension  areas
was  realized  in  1990. This  now  means  that  the  program's  objective  throughout
the  Western  Extension  area  will  be  attained  only  by  2004  when  spraying
operations  can  be  safely  stopped.
24.  Combattlng  Blackfly  Realstance  to  Larvicide.  Anticipating  eventual
development  of  resistance  to  temephos,  OCP  began  identification  and  testing  of
3  The  institutional  provisions  and  arrangements  (including  minimum  pledges
of financial  support)  for  the  execution  of the  program  were  contained  in  the
Onchocerciasis  Fund  Agreements  (1974,  1979,  and  1986)8
alternative  larvicides  early  on  In  the  program.  This  was  undertaken  with  the
full  support  and  encouragement  of  the  EAC,  and  a  monitoring  system  for  early
detection  of  resistance  was  set  in  place.  Resistance  to  temephos  first
emerged  in  1980  but  was  for  many  years  confined  to  an  isolated  part  of
southern  Cate  d'Ivoire.  Chlorphoxim  was  then  introduced  as  a  replacement,  and
then,  soon  after,  came  B cellua  £1urLEn  (n  l  . H-14).  The  different
characteristics  of  ht. H-14,  especially  in  the  formulation  originally
available,  required  appropriate  modifications  to  the  type  of  spraying
equipment  used. It  also  required  the  contracting  of  a  larger  helicopter  at
considerably  increased  cost  to  the  program.  In  1987,  the  resistance  erupted
and  expanded  rapidly  from  C6te  d'Ivoire  to  Mali  and  to  the  Western  Extension
area  where  operations  were  just  getting  underway.  The  Ecological  Group  and
Expert  Advisory  Committee  reviewed  the  situation  and  placed  their  embargo  on
further  extension  of  operations.  Because  of  the  special  formulations  required
to  treat  rivers  and  achieve  maximum  blackfly  control  with  minimum
environmental  impact,  the  program  intensified  its  collaboration  with  the
insecticide  industry  and  its  field  testing  of  new  products.  Chemical
companies  responded  positively  and  this  collaboration  led  to  improved
formulations  of jt. H-14 which  could  be  applied  with  the  aircraft  already
available  in  the  fleet  and  in  the  identification  of  new  larvicide,  including
permethrin  and  carbosulfan.  Today,  the  OCP  uses  six  comnounds,  all  approved
by  the  Expert  Advisory  Committee  and  the  Ecological  Group.  These  are  applied
in  a rotational  scheme  which  lessens  the  risk  of  blackfly  resistance.
25.  Monitoring  the  Environmental  IMgact.  The  program  was  conceived  at  a
time  when  the  use  of  insecticides  was  highly  suspect  following  the  publication
of  a  number  of  very  critical  articles  on  the  use  and  misuse  of  DDT. It  was
important,  therefore,  that  the  OCP,  from  the  outset,  ensure  that  larviciding
would  not  adversely  affect  the  aquatic  fauna  and  flora.  Some  donors  indicated
their  inability  to  support  the  program  should  such  protective  mechanisms  not
be  incorporated.  Accordingly,  an  independent  Ecological  Group  (EG)  was  set  up
and  was  already  functioning  in  1973,  before  the  program  officially  began.
Because  of  its  independent  nature,  this  EG  has  been  able  to  assuage  any  donor
and  international  concerns  about  the  environment  and  to  ensure  that  OCP
continues  on  an  environmentally  sensitive  path.
26.  The  EG  played  a  vital  role  from  the  start  in  drawing  up  protocols  for
monitoring  the  treated  rivers  and  streams.  These  protocols  have  formed  the
basis  for  the  continued  review  of  the  impact  of  larvicide  application.  All
data  collected  are  presented  to  the  EG  for  independent  assessment.  No  new
product  can  be  introduced  to  the  operations  without  the  clearance  of  the  EG.
More  recently,  with  the  use  of  several  different  larvicides  in  rotation,  the
EG  has  paid  particular  attention  to  possible  synergistic  effects  or  any  other
interrelationships  among  the  various  products  used. This  independent
ecological  oversight  has  enabled  the  program  to  continue  larviciding  without
adverse  ecological  impact  for  over  16  years  and  thus  maintain  a  clean  bill  of
environmental  health.
27.  .=t;herAp_y.  The  possibility  of  introducing  alternative  methods  of
control  to  complement  larviciding  has  always  been  a  desired  objective  of  OCP.
It  has  been  hoped  that  chemotherapy  could  someday  replace  larviciding  as  the
principal  means  of  control.  This  depends,  however,  on  the  development  of  an9
effective  macrofilaricide  (i.e.,  a  drug  that  would  kill  the  adult  worms  in  the
human  body)  suitable  for  mass  treatment.  The  Independent  Commission  which
evaluated  the  program  in  1981,  recommended  greater  emphasis  be  placed  on  drug
development  since  it  deemed  that  such  a  drug  was  necessary  ior  the  continu  i
success  of  OCP. Subsequently,  the  Onchocerciasis  Chemotherapy  Project  (OCT)
was  set  up in  1983. This  was  necessary  as  an  adjunct  to  the  WHO/UNDP/World
Bank-sponsored  Special  Program  for  Research  and  Training  in  Tropical  Diseases
(TDR)  to  augment  the  limited  funds  it  could  provide  from  its  budget  for  this
specific  purpose.  OCT  has  collaborated  with  industry  and  research
institutions  in  the  testing  of  thousands  of  pitential  products  in  the  search
for  such  a  drug. To  date  no  acceptable  macrofilaricide  has  been  found,  but
the  efforts  of  OCT  have  led  to  the  discovery  of  ivermectin,  an  effective,
long-acting  microfilaricide,  (i.e.  it  kills  off  the  infant  worms  in  the  skin).
28.  Ivermectin  was  a  drug  developed  by  Merck,  Sharp  and  Dohbe  to  treat
parasites  in  animals.  Its  effectiveness  in  humans  was  establ!.shed  through
clinical  trials  carried  out  by  OCT  in  collaboration  with  TDR. While
ivermectin  does  not  kill  the  adult  parasite,  and  kills  only  tlhe  microfilariae,
it  does  so  without  the  most  unpleasant  and  distressing  side  effects  of
diethylcarbamazine  (DEC),  a  multidose  drug  available  for  years  but  unsuitable
for  mass  treatment.  As  a  bonus,  ivermectin  also  inhibits,  for  reasons  unkown,
the  production  of  further  microfilariae  by the  adult  female  worm  for  about  12
months.
29.  Initially,  expectations  were  high  that  ivermectin  could  be  used  as  a
control  tool  by  itself,  if  adequate,  population-wide  distribution  could  be
organized,  but  field  trials  have  shown  that  the  once-per-year  treatment  leaves
about  5%  microfilariae  infection,  enough  to  allow  continued  transmission  of
the  disease.  While  thus  not  a  suitable  control  tool,  ivermectin  is  most
effective  in  relieving  suffering  and  preventing  blindness  caused  by  the
disease.  The  program  began  large-scale  ivermectin  distribution  in  heavily
infected  villages  in  the  Extension  areas  which  resulted  in  the  above
observations  being  made  in  1988. The  drug  is  being  donated  by  the
manufacturer  for  as  long  as  it  will  be  required  so  as  to  encourage  its  use.
Although  the  drug  is  free,  the  costs  of  its  distribution  and  monitoring  its
effect  are  considerable.  While  presently  these  are  borne  by  the  program  in
addition  t  the  larviciding  costs,  they  will  eventually  have  to  be  transferred
to  the  national  governments.  Despite  its  benefits,  ivermectin  is  not  the
final  answer  to  the  program's  needs  and  the  search  for  a  macrofilarcide
continues.
DLvolution  and  the  Role_go  the  ParticiRating  Countries
30.  With  complete  responsibility  for  -he  control  operations  vested  in  OCP,
the  Participating  Governments  have  pla,_d  a  relatively  minor  role. As  a
result  there  has  been  no  provision  within  their  health  systems  and  in  their
overstretched  budgets  for  the  establishment  of  a  structure,  properly  staffed,
equipped  and  financed,  to  enable  them  to  take  over  when  OCP  is  eventually
wound  up. This  weakness  was  identified  by  the  Independent  Commission  as  early
as  1981  when,  in  its  report,  it  flagged  the  eventual  devolution  of  maintenance
activities  to  the  Participating  Countries  as  an  essential  prerequisite  to  the
successful  conclusion  of  the  OCP.  Since  then,  devolution  has  been  of  major10
concern  of  the  JPC. It  may  be  defined  in  terms  of  preventing  onchocerciasis
recrudescence  in  the  program  area  through  two  activities:  (i)  enidemiological
surveillance  and  (ii)  focal  treatment  with  ivermectin  or  another  drug,  should
it  become  available,  of new  cases  when these  are identified.
31.  For  some  years,  OCP  has  struggled  to  put  devolution  into  an  operational
framework.  Initially,  there  was  no  tool  (or  strategy)  available  that  the
countries  could  employ  on their  own  shoula  there  be a  recrudescence  of the
disease.  It  also became  evident  that  it  made  more  sense  to  defer  devolution
of  responsibility  until,  through  the  efforts  of  OCP,  the  level  of
onchocerciasis  became  such  that  the  risk  of its  recrudescence  was  negligible.
This  was  necessary  since,  to  be effee.tive,  larviciding  must be international
in  coverage  and  only  the  OCP  itself  was  equipped  to  undertake  vector  control
operations  on  such  a  scale.  Now,  encouragement  is  being  given  to  the
countries  to develop  what is  necessary  for  them  to  maintain  the  achievements
of  the  OCP  after  the  larviciding  program  ceases  and  so  prevent  recrudescence.
The  recent  introduction  of  ivermectin  has  provided  the  countries  with  a  tool
to  treat  new  cases  of  the  disease.  As  mentioned  above,  although  ivermectin  is
not  proven  as a control  mechanism  on its  own,  properly  administered,  it  should
keep  the  disease  at  bay. Seven  countries  where  onchocerciasis  is  now  well
under  control,  Burkina  Faso,  Benin,  Cote  d'lvoire,  Ghana,  Mali  an,-!  Niger,  and
Togo  have thus  far  prepared  first  step  devolution  plans.  Technical  support
will  be  provided  by  the  OCP  to  implement  these  plans.
32.  Meanwhile,  to  try  to  overcome  this  hurdle  towards  devolution,  the  OCP
has  involved  the  Participating  Country  governments  in  the  Western  Extension
area  in  other  constructive  ways. From  the  outset  all  staff  engaged  in  the
OCP,  whether  national  or  expatriate,  have  been  employees  of  WHO. This  was
modified  in  1986  in  the  extension  countries  where  staff  were  seconded  to  OCP
but  received  a  supplementary  payment  and  per  diem  from  the  program.  The
national  governments  in  the  extension  area  now  provide  the  personnel  necessary
to  staff  the  entomological  sector  offices  and  the  mobile  teams  involved  in
blackfly  surveys.  These  governments  are  also  participating  fully  in  the
ivermectin  distribution  program.
Reasons  for  Success
33.  Clearly  Defined  Obiective  and  Tiere.  The  most  important  lesson
from  the  OCP  experience  is  that  a  limited  and  realistic  objective,
unambiguously  defined,  and  shared  equally  by  program  staff,  beneficiaries,
donors  and  sponsors,  is  a precondition  for  success.  Such  an objective  gives
the  program  a  clear  mandate  and  the  legitimacy  to  pursue  it.  A  mandate  of
this  nature  should  not  be  equated  with  a  narrowly  defined  operational
strategy.  While  the  OCP,  for  example,  uses  larviciding  as  its  principal
control  tool,  larviciding  pex  se  has  never  become  the  program's  objective.
Larviciding  was  never  confused  with  onchocerciasis  control. The  latter  point
is  especially  important  since  many  other  health  programs  and  other  targeted
development  efforts  have confused  ends  and  means  --  with poor  results.
Malaria  control  programs,  for  example,  set  out  to  control  malaria  but  soon
became  extremely  rigid  DDT  spraying  programs  which  later  proved  unable  to
adapt  to  changing  epidemiological  or  fiscal  conditions.11
34.  The  OCP  has  been guided  throughout  by technical  considerations  and  not
by political  pressures. This  was exemplified  in 1986  when C8te  d'Ivoire  made
a  strong  plea to  have the  OCP  area  extended  to control  onchocerciasis  in the
forest  area.  The EAC  examined  the  situation  in 1987  and reported  to  the  JPC
later  that  year that  OCP's  mandate  was control  of the  blinding  form  of
onchocerciasis  in  the  savannah  areas  and  such  an  extension  was  not justified.
Despite  further  pleas  by CMte  d'Ivoire,  the  EAC  maintained  its  advice  to the
;PC,  which  enabled  the  JPC to  make a  definitive  decision  not to extend
operations,  thus  saving  the  program  from  both  operational  and financial
*  difficulties. Such  single-mindedness  of  purpose  has  been  a critical  dimension
in the  successful  implementation  and  day  to  day  management  of the  program.
35.  The  OCP  and the  donors  agreed  at the  beginning  of the  program  on a
realistic  timeframe  for  achievement  of program  objectives. The request  for  a
20-year  commitment  by the  donors  was  unprecedented  and  did  not  meet  with the
immediate  approval  of potential  donors. Nonetheless,  the  proponents  of the
program  remained  firm  in their  assessment  that  this  timeframe  was  appropriate
and  realistic  based  on epidemiological  facts  (principally  the  then  conceived
15 to 18  year lifespan  of the  adult  worm).
36.  Chbice  2f  Technology. Part  of the  program's  success  can  be attributed
to its  conscientious  pursuit  of the  best  technology  available  for  any task.
Consequently,  aircraft  have  been  used  to apply  larvicide  and,  more  recently,
water  level  data  have  been transmitted  using  state  of the  art  methods  via
satellite  enabling  more accurate  spraying  levels  so reducing  environmental
risk.  Computer  modelling  of onchocerciasis  transmission  has  been developed
and  is  used in forecasting  the  progress  of operations. Chromosome  reading  was
Introduced  to identify  species  of the  S. da!m-nos  complex  more efficiently  and
the  separation  of  vector  and  non-vector  species. This reliance  on the  most
advanced  tools  available  has  helped  maintain  the  cost-efficiency  of
operations.
37.  Contracting  Out  Highlv  SReCialized  Tasks. Another  lesson  which is  of
broader  interest  concerns  the  contracting  out  of highly  specialized
operations. Aerial  spraying  operations,  the  key  element  in the  OCP strategy,
were contracted  out to  private  companies  uniquely  qualified  for  the  task.  The
OCP accepted  early  on that  it lacked  the  expertise  to  undertake  such  a large
and  complex  spraying  effort  involving  a fleet  of  helicopters  and sophisticated
spraying  equipment. OCP  did  not  make the  mistake  that  many  public  agencies
have made --  of feeling  obliged  to undertake  tasks  considered  critical  to
achieving  program  objectives  with in-house  staff  under  their  direct  control.
It realized  that it  could  bett.r  maintain  control  and  demand  a higher  level  of
quality  if  this  critical  task  were  contracted  out  to a  highiy  specialized  and
qualified  firm.
38.  ODerational esegarch.  OCP,  throughout  its  existence,  has spent  about
15%  of its  budget  on operational  research  which  has always  been considered  an
eoual  partner  in  program  implementation.  By  undertaking  such  operations-
related  research,  OCP  has constantly  improved  its  control  technology  and  has
even  generated  new control  tools. It  has led  to the  creation  of a special
drug  development  fund  to seek  a specific  drug  (a  macrofilaricide  suitable  for
mass treatmert)  which  would  interrupt  onchocerciasis  transmission.  This12
operational  research  has not  only  increased  the  program's  efficiency  and
reduced  costs (for  example,  satellite  transmission  of data  on accurate  water
discharge)  but  has ensured  survival  of the  program  when critical  technical
challenges  arose  (for  example,  rapid  spread  of resistance). Therefore,
emphasis  on operational  research  has greatly  facilitated  the  program's
adaptation  to  new situations.
39.  New larvicides.  as soon  as they  were  approved  by the  Ecological  Group,
were incorporated  in  the  OCP arsenal;  susceptibility  testing  became  routine
for  signalling  when resistance  was appearing,  and  a  change  of product  was
called  for;  new  techniques  for identifying  adults  and  larvae  of the  blackfly
species  were immediately  exploited  to target  the  important  vectors;  improved
larvicide  application  equipment  developed  by the  program  was incorporated  in
the  bid documents  of  new aerial  contracts;  methods  of distinguishing  forest
from  savannah  types  of onchocerciasis  parasites  are  being  sought  to enable  a
more effective  demarcation  of the  program  area;  a  mathematical  model  of
onchocerciasis  has reached  an advanced  state  of  development  enabling
predictions  to  be made of the  long-term  imract  of  both  vector  and  chemotherapy
control  and the  risks  of recrudescence.
40.  Autonomy  of the  Program. The  program  was set  up with a  high degree  of
autonomy  from  the  Sponsoring  Agencies. Specifically,  while  WHO is the
executing  agency  for  the  program,  the  OCP  has  never  come  under  the  direct
jurisdiction  of the  World  Health  Assembly  or the  WHO  Executive  Board. Its
special  position  has enabled  it  to  overcome  many of the  administrative
procedures  of WHO that  might  ha"e  hampered  implementation  or brought  it into
competition  with other  health  priorities  of  WHO.  A highly  specialized  program
such  as  OCP, is  very different  in  nature  from  the  horizontally  organized
Primary  Health  Care  programs  which  have  been  promoted  by  WHO over  the  last
decade. Also in this  way  WHO, itself  a donor  to the  Special  Fund,  is
effectively  a co-sponsor  of the  program  and  does  not  charge  the  usual  14%
agency  administration  fee  which  would  normally  apply.
41.  The Program  Director,  having  been  delegated  full  responsibility  for  OCP
matters  by the  Director-General  of  WHO,  reports  directly  to the  JPC for
matters  concerning  the  program. The  program's  autonomy  has enabled  it to
adjust  operations  quickly  as circumstances  dictate. The  autonomy  of the  OCP
has  proven  especially  important  given  the  fact  that  it  has  been implemented
during  a time  when  attention  to  tropical  diseases  has declined  vis-a-vis  other
important  health  concerns.
42.  The  program  has  been  kept  on track  by its  own  in-built  system  of checks
and  balances--which  in the  OCP's  case  provided  by the  EAC  and  the EG.  These
bodies  act  as technical  auditors  and  periodically  provide  objective
reassurance  to supporters  that  continued  commitment  is  justified;  they  also
help determine  and  legitimize  any  mid-course  corrections  that  become
necessary. The  EAC  and EG  produce  detailed  scientific  documents  which  are  a
staple  of the  annual  JPC  meetings. The  credibility  generated  by this  open
flow  of information  has  helped  maintain  donor  support. There is  also the
financial  auditing  of the  program  which is  carried  out  annually  by both the
internal  and  external  auditors  of  WHO, who  have  been  very constructive  and
laudatory  in their  comments  or OCP. As fiscal  agent,  the  Bank,  on its  own  and13
through  the  CSA  also  maintains  a  financial  brief  on the  Program's  operations
and  expenditures  on  behalf  of  the  JPC.
43.  Goaoern  oQf  the  XmorAm. Delegation  of  authority  to  those  most
closely  involved  in  the  program  has  been  crucial  to  assuring  its  ongoing
success.  The  CSA,  which  meets  three  to  four  times  per  year,  has  proven  a
useful,  persistent  referee  of the  OCP since  the  beginning. The  delegation  of
responsibility  for  policy  development  and  financial  supervision  to  the  GSA  has
enabled  crucial  decisions  to  be  taken  between  annual  meetings  of  the  JPC. The
JPC  mandated  the  CSA  to  approve  overruns  on  the  budget  of  up  to  10  in  any  one
year,  to  meet  unforeseen  expenditures.  Such  overruns  were  possible  because  of
the  reserve  held  in  the  Trust  Fund. The  CSA  supported  the  Bank  in  its  efforts
to  obtain  approval  for  a  prescribed  contingency  reserve  held  in  the  Trust  Fund
to  meet  any  emergency  and  to  carry  over  the  OCP  from  one  financial  phase  to
the  next. The  CSA  was  also  given  responsibility  for  following  socioeconomic
development  of  the  area  and,  through  the  Bank,  has  been  instrumental  in
fielding  a  number  of  specific  studies.  Overall  the  CSA  has  played  a  major
role  in  ensuring  that  the  program  meets  its  objective  by  responding  in  a
timely  fashion  to  changing  operational  and  financial  requirements  and  in
providing  independent  support  when  necessary.
44.  Through  the  delegation  of  responsibility  to  him,  the  Program  Director
has direct  access  to the  CSA  as  well as to the  donors  and  to the  Participating
Country  governments.  At  the  national  level,  the  Presidents  of  each  of  the
Participating  Countries  appointed  National  Onchocerciasis  Committees  to
resolve  problems  related  to  the  program  so  that  decisions  can  be  made  quickly
to  avoid  operational  delays.  The  independence  of  the  EAC  and  the  EG  has
enabled  them  to  play  an  important  role  in  influencing  the  governance  of  the
program  and  has  prevented  technical  issues  from  being  viewed  politically,  a
very  necessary  control  in  such  a  multicountry  program.
45.  Overall,  this  delegation  of  authority  throughout  the  program  has  allowed
a  continuity  of  governance  by  selecting  individuals  devoted  to  the  program's
objectives  and  has  ensured  that  a  clear  focus  has  been  maintained  year  after
year. It  has  also  permitted  a  necessary  degree  of  flexibility  that  has  made
it  possible  to  respond  in  a  timely  and  effective  manner  to  strategic  and
technological  problems.
46.  Medium-Term  Ela=ning and  SustainedDonor  Cmmitment. In  1973,  the  PAG
mission  report  made it clear  that  success  would  depend  on a minimum  20-year
financial  commitment.  Faced  with  the  difficulty  of  sustaining  donor  support
over  such  a long  period,  the  program  was divided  into  a  series  of medium-term
planning  phases.  For  each  of  these  six  year  periods,  the  program  prepared  a
detailed  plan  of operations  outlining  the  objectives  to  be reached  during  that
period,  any  modifications  necessary  and  the  estimated  cost  of the  operations.
Based  on  these  plans  approved  by  the  JPC,  the  donors  adjusted  the  level  of
their  pledges  for  the  period.  At  the  start  of  each  of  the  six-year  financial
phases  these  revised  pledges  were  incorporated  in  a  new  Trust  Fund  Agreement
signed  by  the  donors.  The  Memorandum  of  Agreement  which  became  an  integral
part  of  the  Trust  Fund  Agreement  was  signed  by  the  Participating  Governments.
These  Fund  Agreements  have  disallowed  earmarking,  thus  permitting  a  high
degree  of  flexibility  in  financial  management  of  the  program.  In  this  regard,14
at  its  scheduled  meetings,  the  JPC  has  the  opportunity  to  review  any
modifications  detailed  in  annual  budgets  supported  by  Plans  of  Action
submitted  for  approval.  These  Agreements,  based  on  approved  Plans  of
Operations,  on  the  one  hand  tie  the  program  into  what  it  has  to  accomplish  in
the  six  year  period  and,  on  the  other,  obligate  the  donors  to  an  agreed  level
of  financial  support  for  the  same  period  and  the  Participating  Countries  to
their  responsibilities.  They  have  been  crucial  to  ensuring  the  successful
evolution  of  the  OCP  and  could  provide  a  model  for  other  programs  involving
long  term  commitments  and  cooperation  between  a  number  of  donors,  agencies  and
governments.
47.  TransDarency  - Infomtion Flow. The  program  has  benefited  greatly  from
the  transparency  achieved  by  maintaining  an  unrestricted  flow  of  information
about  the  program  amongst  all  parties  involved.  It  has  also  benefitted  from
its  own  openness  to  inspection  and  review.  The  program  has  undergone  annual
technical  audits  by  the  EAC  which  has  reported  its  findings  in  frank  annual
reports  to the  JPC.  The  OCP itself  provides  a  detailed  progress  report  to
each  JPC  meeting  (both  verbal  and  written)  which  covers  technical,  policy  and
financial  issues.  The  OCP  openly  welcomed  the  Independent  Commission  review
in 1981,  the  USAID  Review  Group  review  in 1985  and  an Independent  External
Review  requested  by the  donors  in  1990. This  statutory  reporting  system  is
augmented  by regular  visits  to the  donors  by combined  Bank/OCP  missions  and  by
the  OCP to the  Participating  Countrles.  Throughout,  difficulties  have  been
openly  and  candidly  debated;  this  transparency  has  been greatly  appreciated  by
all  parties  concerned. This  openness  has  played  no small  role  in  maintaining
the  confidence  of an ever-increasing  group  of donors  and  has  helped  ensure  the
continual  financing  of the  program. Confidence  in the  program  has also
encouraged  Participating  Countries  to maintain  their  annual  1.4%  contribution
to  OCP.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
AuthoI&QC  ZIQ  for paper
WPS717  Does  Financial  Liberalization  Really  Jacques  Morisset  July 1991  S. King-Watson
Improve  Private Investment  in  31047
Developing  Countries?
WPS718  Impact  of Investment  Policies  on  Andrea  Gubitz  July 1991  S. King-Watson
German  Direct Investment  in Developing  31047
Countries: An Empirical  Investigation
WPS719  How  Trade  and  Economic  Policies  Ramon  Lopez  July 1991  M. Gunasekara
Affect  Agriculture:  A Framework  for  Ridwan  Ali  32261
Analysis  Applied  to Tanzania  and  Bjorn  Larsen
Malawi
WPS720  The  Outlook  for Commercial  Bank  Ellen  Johnson  Sirleaf  July 1991  S. King-Watson
Lending  to Sub-Saharan  Africa  Francis  Nyirjesy  31047
WPS721  The Demand  for Money  in Developing Patricio  Arrau  July 1991  S. King-Watson
Countries: Assessing  the Role  Jos6 De Gregorio  31047
of Financial  Innovation  Carmen  Reinhart
Peter Wickham
WPS722  Is Rice  Becoming  an Inferior  Good?  Merlinda  D. Ingco  July 1991  P. Kokila
Food  Demand  in the Philippines  33716
WPS723  Improving  Women's  and  Children's  Olayinka  Abosede  July 1991  0. Nadora
Nutrition  in Sub-Saharan  Africa:  Judith  S. McGuire  31091
An Issues  Paper
WPS724  Fiscal Issues  in Adjustment:  Riccardo  Faini  July 1991  D. Ballantyne
An Introduction  Jaime  de Melo  37947
WPS725  How  Structure  of Production  Indermit  S.  Gill  July 1991  A. Sloan
Determines  the Demand  for Human  Shahidur  R. Khandker  35108
Capital
WPS726  Perspectives  on the Design  of  Anwar  Shah  July 1991  A. Bhalla
Intergovernmental  Fiscal Relations  37699
WPS727  The Effects  of Debt  Subsidies  on  Mansoor  Dailami  July 1991  A. Bruce-Konuah
Corporate  Investment  Behavior  E.  Han  Kim  80356
WPS728  Does  Better  Access  to Contracep-  Susan  Cochrane  July 1991  0. Nadora
tives Increase  their Use? Key  Policy  Laura  Gibney  31091
and Methodological  Issues
WPS729  Is Export Diversification  the Best  Ridwan  Ali  July 1991  M. Gunasekara
Way  to Achieve  Export  Growth  and  Jeffrey Alwang  32260
Stability?  A Look  at Three  African  Paul  B.  Siegel
CountriesPRE  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
eA6  Author  for  paper
WPS730  Wage  and Employment  Policies  in  Luis  A. Riveros  July 1991  V. Charles
Czechoslovakia  33651
WPS7S1 Efficiency  Wage Theory,  Labor  Luis  A. Riveros  July 1991  V. Charles
Markets,  and Adjustment  Lawrence  Bouton  33651
WPS732  Stabilization  Programs  in Eastern  Fabrizio  Coricelli  July 1991  R. Marlin
Europe: A Comparative  Analysis  of  Roberto  de Rezende  Rocha  39065
the Polish  and Yugoslav  Programs
of 1990
WPS733  The  Consulting  Profession  in  Syed  S. Kirmani  July 1991  INUDR
Developing  Countries:  A Strategy  for  Warren  C. Baum  33758
Development
WPS734  Curricular  Content,  Educational  Aaron  Benavot  July 1991  C. Cristobal
Expansion,  and Economic  Growth  33640
WPS735 Traditional  Medicine  in Sub-Saharan  Jocelyn  DeJong  July 1991  0. Nadora
Africa: Its Importance  and Potential  31091
Policy  Options
WPS736  Wages  and  Employment  in the  Simon  Commander  August 1991  0. Del  Cid
Transition  to a Market  Economy  Fabrizio  Coricelli  39050
Karsten  Staehr
WPS737  External  Shocks,  Adjustment  Delfin  S.  Go  August 1991
Policies,  and !nvestment in a
Developing  Economy: Illustrations
from  a Forward-looking  CGE  Model
of the Philippines
WPS738  Tax  Competition  and Tax  Ravi Kanbur  August 1991  J. Sweeney
Coordination:  When  Countries  Michael  Keen  31021
Differ  in Size
WPS739  Managing  Financial  Risks  in Papua  Jonathan  R. Coleman  August  1991  J. Carroll
New  Guinea: An  Optimal  External  Ying  Qian  33715
Debt Portfolio
WPS740  The  Onchocerciasis  Control  Program Bernhard  H. Liese  August 1991  0. Nadora
in West  Africa: A Long-term  John  Wilson  31091
Commitment  to Success  Bruce Benton
Douglas  Marr
WPS741  When  Does  Rent-Seeking  Augment  David  Tarr  August 1991  D. Ballantyne
the Benefits  of Price  and  Trade  Reform  37947
on Rationed  Commodities?  Estimates
for Automobiles  and  Color  Televisions
in Poland